National Emergency Management Agency lacked visible command, coordination and control during Cyclone Gabrielle, says Government Inquiry
The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) lacked visible command, control, and coordination of the national response during Cyclone Gabrielle, the Government Inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Event has reported.
The Inquiry, which heard from a range of organisations about NEMA’s role in Cyclone Gabrielle, says that major changes are needed in New Zealand’s response to natural disasters.
The Inquiry, led by former Governor-General Sir Jerry Mateparae, was set up by Government to review the response to Cyclone Gabrielle, and other North Island weather events last year.
The Inquiry said that Cyclone Hale, the Auckland Anniversary heavy rainfall, and Cyclone Gabrielle were collectively the most severe and destructive weather events in New Zealand’s recent history.
“They resulted in significant devastation to property and ongoing trauma for communities. Most tragically, 15 people died, and a year on one person remains missing. The Treasury estimates the events caused between $9 and $14.5 billion of physical damage to households, businesses, and infrastructure.”
The Inquiry found that the country’s emergency management system is not fit-for-purpose; and that there is a major disconnect between communities and Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) agencies.
“We observed a striking disconnect between the way communities and CDEM agencies – particularly councils and CDEM Groups – viewed the response to the severe weather events.”
“Many CDEM agencies had a perception or assumption that communities and volunteer groups knew their role in the immediate response. Often these expectations did not seem to be evident to the communities themselves.”
The Inquiry said they heard from many community groups who stepped up to support their own communities’ needs and gave their support to others without hesitation.
“However, many impacted people and communities told the Inquiry they were not aware they had a part to play. Most had no local community plans to put into action and, for those that did, there was a lack of worst-case scenario planning.”
“We heard repeatedly from many people in affected areas that they felt let down by the CDEM response. Many community leaders told us they did not feel like they were a part of a formal response and were simply stepping up because they saw a need.”
During the severe weather events, the emergency management system, including The Inquiry found that the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), was overwhelmed and unable to respond as needed.
“We heard from a range of organisations, including some CDEM Groups and central government agencies, that NEMA lacked visible command, control, and coordination of the national response during Cyclone Gabrielle.”
The report said that part of the challenge for NEMA, and CDEM agencies generally, was the lack of realtime situational awareness about what was happening in affected regions.
“In part, this was due to communications being down during Cyclone Gabrielle. Of greater concern is the lack of investment in the technology to build a common operating platform that would provide real-time situational awareness.”
“This issue is not new. For too long this matter has sat in the ‘too hard-basket’ – it needs addressing urgently.”
The Inquiry also found that some immediate response activities failed to perform as needed in Auckland for the Auckland Anniversary heavy rainfall, and in Hawke’s Bay for Cyclone Gabrielle, exacerbating the trauma felt by communities.
“Many people we heard from, particularly in Auckland and Hawke’s Bay, felt abandoned and let down by their council and the immediate CDEM response. Some councils pushed back against this perception. The Inquiry observed that there is a striking disconnect between communities and their councils in some places .”
The Inquiry heard about the challenges faced by the Hawke’s Bay CDEM Group when making decisions and communicating warnings in an event of the scale and speed of Cyclone Gabrielle.
“To issue evacuation warnings to flood-affected residents, they needed credible information to justify the decision, the means to issue the warning in an effective manner, and confidence that evacuation was the safer course of action.”
“In Hawke’s Bay, the forecast rainfall for Cyclone Gabrielle was much less than what fell, and the systems that capture rainfall data and water levels (and which inform emergency management staff to a change in the situation) were compromised by loss of internet and power outages. The loss of internet service and power outages also compromised some channels through which warnings or notifications were communicated.”
The Inquiry said that during Cyclone Gabrielle, the rescue requirements were particularly broad and complex, with land, water and air rescue expertise all required.
“Many community members who did not have a formal role in the response also assisted in the rescue effort, using boats and helicopters to bring people to safety.”
The Inquiry found that some of the most effective and rapid responses to the severe weather events were coordinated and carried out by iwi Māori, including iwi, hapū, marae, taiwhenua, trusts, incorporations and whānau.
“They provided manaakitanga, critical equipment, response and wellbeing support, money, and facilities for welfare to all people in their rohe. Early activation of marae and community structures and networks meant iwi Māori responded more effectively than some councils. In places where the CDEM response was slow or lacking, and in communities of high poverty and isolation, they often stepped in to support the needs of people and utilised broad iwi networks to deploy supplies.”
“Iwi-led civil defence readiness, response and recovery are already in effect, and provide a living example of what can be done in an emergency. However, the inclusion of iwi Māori in formal local government emergency management structures is discretionary and, in some regions, non-existent.”
“Iwi Māori who have the capacity, capability, and desire to be involved in emergency readiness and response should be empowered to take on a greater role. To give effect to this, the role of iwi Māori in emergency management should be formalised and embedded within the one emergency management system, so it is reflected throughout the community, local, regional, and national structures. We endorse the recommendations of the 2017 Ministerial Review into Better Responses to Natural Disasters to recognise iwi contributions and legislate for iwi participation in readiness, response, and recovery.”
The aviation response during Cyclone Gabrielle was the largest in the country’s history, and it took place under very challenging circumstances, the Inquiry has reported.
“A rescue operation of the scale seen in Hawke’s Bay had not been planned for or practised. Many flights were required to conduct urgent rescues, send crews to repair critical infrastructure, and deliver goods and personnel to affected areas.”
The Inquiry also says that Health and disability services have a legislated role in emergency management, but the Inquiry heard there is a need to strengthen the way this role is carried out and integrated into the wider system.
“The chief executive or a senior member of a provider of health and disability services is required to be a member of the CEG in each council or unitary authority. Relationships in the health and disability sector (including Health New Zealand) and other CDEM agencies need to be well established before an emergency event. This was not always the case during the severe weather events. “
The Inquiry heard there was a particular breakdown of the relationship between Health New Zealand and the Hawke’s Bay CDEM Group Emergency Coordination Centre during Cyclone Gabrielle, which led to a critical gap in situational awareness for health officials.
PHOTO: NZDF
